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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S.
pAGE,

).

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
;

vs.
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Utah corporatio,n,

(
)

Case
No. 8815

Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The Respondents have no serious disagreement with tire
Statement of Facts contained in the Appellant's brief. Since
the argument of the case requires a complete review of the
evidence, no attempt will be made to call attention to any
disagreement with statements therein made.
3
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The Appellant has chosen to state its argument in seven
different points. However, it appears to the Respondents that
all of the points are directed to one issue, namely, was there
sufficient competent evidence to justify the submission of
the case to the jury? The question of whether Alma M. Page,
prior to his death, delivered his insurance policy to the company, Appellant's Point One, is only one factor in determining
if an election had been made on the policy prior to the insured's
death. Whether the election was made in writing or orally
is not the issue now before the Court or before the jury ( Appellant's Point Two) . Whether the insured intended to elect
one of the options is the same issue as whether he, in fact, did
make the election pursuant to one of the options (Appellant's
Points Three and Four) . Whether the court should have
granted the Defendant's motion for a directed verdict or the
Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or the granting of a new trial all raised the sufficiency of the
evidence to justify the submission of the case to the jury and
to sustain the verdict of the jury rendered thereon. For these
reasons the Respondents shall answer all of the arguments of
the Appellant under the following point:
POINT ONE: THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT
EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION OF THE
CASE TO THE JURY AND SUSTAIN ITS VERDICT
BASED THEREON.
The defendant corporation places considerable emphasis
upon the testimony of Mrs. Ruth Page. Mrs. Page came from
Denmark in 1949, and it was obvious that she was susceptible
to being lead by counsel and did not clearly understand all of
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the technical terms involved. Her testimony in most instances
was vague and indefinite. When being asked about a letter,
Exhibit 12, the policy or discussions, some of her answers
were as follows:

"Q. Erich kept it? Now, afterwards, !vfrs. Page, did
you and your husband receive anything through
the mails from the insurance company?
A. That is what I think we did." (R .25).
Q. Now, after that, what did you do? Let me rephrase
it. Now was that policy delivered to you and your
husband?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Did you and your husband talk about it, the insurance policy, after it came back from the insurance company?
A. No, I don't think so." (R. 26).

"Q. How did you know it was fixed?
A. I saw the paper that I thought was with it. I don't
know if it was attached.
Q. Where was the paper which you saw?
A. With the insurance when it came back.
Q. Was it in the front? Was it in the back? Where
was it?
A. I don't recall.
Q. You don't recall where that piece of paper was, is
that right?
A. Yes, that is right." (R. 26).
"Q. How did you know that it was fixed the way you
wanted?

5
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A. There must have been a piece of paper there.

Q. Was anything in there besides a piece of paper in
that envelope?
A. I don't recall.

Q. I'll show you what has been marked Defendant's
Exhibit 12 and ask you to read that and tell me
whether or not you have ever seen the original of
that letter?
A. I'm afraid I didn't read it too well if we did get it.
Q. Well, did you ever see a letter like that?
A. Do I .have to say yes or no?" (R. 27).
Although Mrs. Page used the word "paid-up" it was
obvious from the discussions that that term was the one which
best described the desire that some arrangement be made with
the policy so that future premiums would not have to be paid.
In the use which she made of the term, it could have applied
equally as well to extended term at full face coverage for
fourteen years, cash surrender value, or actually paid-up insurance. She testified:

"Q. You wanted to make arrangements so that you
wouldn't have to make any further payments?
A. Yes.
Q. You also testified that Mr. Olschewski told you of
different ways to arrange so that you wouldn't have
to make further payments?
A. Yes.
Q. You were interested in cash surrender, reduced
paid-up insurance, or extended term-any one of
those ways-so that you wouldn't have to pay any
more?
A. Well, yes." (R. 30).

6
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When asked if she recalled the discussions concerning a
five-year plan with reference to the policy, the amount of cash
surrender value which was available, extended term insurance?
or whether the figure of fourteen years at full coverage was
discussed, she state she didn't recall and added:
'Tm afraid I let my husband decide what it is."

(R. 32).
It should be remembered that her deposition was taken
prior to the trial, at which time the term "Paid-up insurance"
was frequently discussed, and it is therefore not unreasonable
to assume that with her understanding of these technical
matters she would use that term to indicate the termination
of any requirement that premiums be paid.

The defendant company has attached to their brief a
letter, Exhibit 10. It was established that they had requested
from Mrs. Page any letters or correspondence which had been
received by her or her husband from the company. Mrs. Page
was unable to find the original of Exhibit 10, and that document was submitted on the basis of the office copy, solely upon
the testimony that under the normal office routine procedure
it would have been mailed.
Although the evidence cited by the defendant corporation
might be sufficient if standing alone to warrant a judgment
in its favor, or if the jury had decided in its favor it might be
sufficient to sustain that verdict, it is submitted that the evidence contradicting the position of the defendant corporation
is more probative, is more substantial, is more credible in light
of all of the circumstances and is more than sufficient to
sustain the verdict of the jury. Clearly, it shows a definite con7
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flict in the evidence on a factual issue and therefore required
its submission for determination by the jury.
Any number of recent Utah Supreme Court decisions
state the proposition that if there is any substantial competent
evidence to support the determination of the jury, the same
shall be affirmed on appeal; or, stated differently, that if the
evidence is in conflict so that it cannot be said as a matter
of law that all reasonable persons would draw the same conclusion from said evidence, then there is a factual issue to
be determined by the jury. The Appellant has chosen to review
the evidence in the light most favorable to its position; however, the traditional rules on review are to the contrary, more
particularly, that the evidence will be reviewed in the light
most favorable to the Respondents in this case, the jury having
made a determination in their favor, and the Court having
ruled in their favor in submitting the issues to the jury for their
determination, and in later refusing a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as well as refusing a new trial.
The policy of insurance, Exhibit 1, was admitted at the
time of pre-trial and was introduced at the time of trial. On
its face there have been no changes, and there was not attached
to it any rider or endorsement modifying or changing the
policy. Consequently, it was admitted by all and ruled by the
Court that, upon the introduction of the policy, the Plaintiffs
had established a prima facie case.

Thereafter, it became

incumbent upon the Defendant to prove its affirmative defense; more particularly, that the insured had elected to modify
the policy to one of paid-up msurance. The case was tried
8
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then upon the basis that the Defendant had the burden of proof
upon this issue. The policy by its terms provides an automatic
non-forfeiture provision to the effect that, even if the premiums
are not paid, the policy will be continued on extended term,
which in this case would have given coverage for a period
in excess of fourteen years. There is another provision in the
policy where, if the insured or owner of the policy at the
time of its procurement so indicated, an automatic premium
loan provision applied, and the cash equity in the policy would
be used for an automatic loan to pay the premium. It was
admitted by the vice president of the defendant company that
there was sufficient cash equity that, if this provision were
applicable, the policy would be in full force and effect on
the date of the insured's death (R. 54) .
The Defendant made the opening and closing argument
before the jury on the basis that it had the ultimate burden of
proof, and in its brief on Page 33 states that the burden of
proof fell upon the Defendant to prove that the insured had,
prior to his death, elected the option of reduced paid-up insurance. Therefore, the verdict of the jury may be sustained
on either of two theories: First, that the Defendant failed to
sustain the burden of proof, or, second, that there is sufficient
competent evidence that they as a matter of fact made a determination against the Defendant and in favor of the Plaintiff
that no such election had been made. It is submitted that the
following evidence is ample to justify the latter determination
by the jury and is more than sufficient to require this Court
to affirm the verdict.
Evidence was introduced that the Defendant company
9
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did not have any written request showing that an election had
been made, even though in other respects it was the policy
of their company to require written elections or requests
indicating modifications or other action involving policies.
There was no carbon copy of the alleged endorsement or rider
which was supposed to have been attached to the policy. It
was maintained that the rider or endorsement had been attached by eyelets to the front of the policy; however, the jury
was requested to examine the eyelets to see if they had been
removed or changed or if there was any evidence of fragments
of paper remaining thereunder, indicating a document had
been removed. Evidence was introduced that it was the usual
custom to require that such an election in the insurance business be made upon written request duly signed by the insured.
It was maintained by the Defendant that it had advised
Lincoln National Life, their re-insurance company, that the
policy had been so changed. However, a search of the records
of this only independent source of information concerning this
matter failed to produce any evidence that such a change had
been made, or that the company had been so advised of such
a change. After the death of the insured, one of the Plaintiffs
called and talked to a secretary of the Defendant company
and inquired about the policy, advised the company that the
insured had been killed, and was advised after some delay
that the amount on the policy was the full face amount, minus
a $400 loan. The documents of the company are inconsistent
as to dates when the policy lapsed, and the date that the
company maintains that the election was made. Although the
company painstakingly made changes on numerous company
cards and indexes with red pencil to the effect that the policy
10
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had been converted, they did not make any change upon the
face of the policy, which they maintain was in their possession.
Again it was testified that the usual custom with a policy in
the trade is to make the change right on the face of the policy
by striking through the face amount and inserting the modified
amount for which paid-up insurance would be granted. The
Plaintiff testified that he had a discussion with the vice president and the president of the company, and that they stated
a mistake had been made, and that if the re-insurance company
would make payment, they would pay the full amount of the
policy. Incidentally, counsel for the insurance company, in a
letter after the issue was raised, stated that if the Defendant
company is on the risk for an amount in excess of $10,000,
then Lincoln National was also on the risk under the original
of this agreement. Such evidence is more particularly reviewed
as follows:
1. NO SIGNED, WRITTEN DOCUMENT SHOWING

AN ELECTION FOR PAID-UP INSURANCE.
After the death of the insured, his father, one of the
Plaintiffs, went to the office of the company and had a conference with Mr. Olschewski. Mr. Page asked to see a copy
of the election or endorsement. In this regard, Mr. Page testified as follows:
"A. I met him, and Mr. Olschewski seemed to be very
nervous, and I wanted a signed document from
my son where he signed a document where he
reduced the fact amount of that policy.

Q. What did he say when you told him that?
11
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A. He became very angry. He said he didn't have any
signature of my son.
Q. Did he attempt to find one?
A. Yes.
Q. When he looked, were you present?
A. I was present, my wife and my son's wife.
Q. Did he go through the files in your presence?
A. Yes, he went through many files.

Q. Did he produce for you any instructions, any signed
election?
A. No, he did not.
Q. Did he produce for you a copy of the endorsement?
A. No, he didn't. I asked for that. I said, 'You say you
have no signed document where he elected the
paid-up insurance and reduced the value of the
insurance? Where is the attachment to the policy,
the duplicate?' And he said there would have been
an attachment to the policy. I said it wasn't attached
to the policy and he said he didn't have any duplicate. I asked him, 'What have you got?' He said
he had a carbon, two carbon copies of a letter
he had written to my son. I said, 'Well, it seems
funny you should have two carbon copies of a
letter supposed to have been written to my son
and no carbon copies of the endorsement or no
carbon copies of the account of the original paidup endorsement." (R. 98, 99).
On this matter, Mr. Olschewski testified as follows:

"Q. Did you in this case request a written election by
the insured ?

A. No.
12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Q. You do not have in your files any written document
of any kind which he signed or otherwsie indicated
what election he want to take, if any?
A. That is right." (R. 59).
2. IN THE INSURANCE TRADE IT IS THE USUAL

CUSTOM, POLICY AND PROCEDURE TO REQUIRE A
SIGNED, WRITTEN ELECTION WHEN A POLICY IS
CONVERTED TO PAID-UP INSURANCE.
Although Mr. Olschewski, vice president of the Defendant
corporation, denied that at the time the change was made he
knew that such custom prevailed in the industry, he did admit
that he now knew such was the custom. He was asked:
"Do you not know that it is the usual policy and practice of the insurance companies in this area to require
a written election on non-forfeiture options?
A. I do qot know that.

Q. Do you know it now?
A. Yes.

Q. Do you understand then that it is the general policy
of insurance companies in this area?
A. I think it is the advisable thing to do to prevent this
kind of thing." (R. 61).
Mr. Wilmer Barnett, cashier of Lincoln National Life,
a Home Office employee, being employed at the Regional
Office here in Salt Lake City, and who testified that he had
had twenty years experience in the insurance business, testified
about this custom as follows:

"Q. Would you state what is the custom, policy, or
procedure?

13
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A. Any person making any changes in reference to a
policy does so only over the signature of the owner
thereafter.
Q. Does that apply to
changes?

a non-forfeiture or other

A. To all changes including non-forfeiture.
Q. What other types are there?
A. The owner might change the benficiary on his
policy. He has the right to change the ownership
or control and transfer it to someone else. He may
make an election of dividend options as well as
non-forfeiture options in the policy.
Q. In all those cases that same custom and procedure
applies?
A. The signature of the owner of the policy is the
manner in which that is accepted." (R. 108).
Mr. Olschewski testified that he had been with the Defendant company from the time of its inception in 1950, and
that his duties involved policy issuing, underwriting, claims
department, re-insurance and policy adjustments and modifications (R. 56). Mr. Olschewski testified that it was the
policy of his company in connection with reinstatement applications handled by him that they be signed by the owner and
that usually the company procured a written election in connection with dividend payments (R. 56-58).
3. THE COMPANY COULD NOT PRODUCE A CARBON COPY OF THE ALLEGED ENDORSEMENT OR
RIDER WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO THE POLICY.
14
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Mr. Olschewski testified that he was familiar with the
office routine of the company and that it was the usual practice
and procedure of the company to make carbon copies of all
documents so that the company could keep a complete file of
all transactions (R. 63). He further testified that he dictated
the letter of transmittal and the endorsement at the same time,
and that he did not instruct the secretary to either make or
not to make carbon copies for the company's files (R. 63).
The secretary, who happened to be the wife of the vice president, Mr. Olschewski, testified that she made an original and
two carbon copies of the letter (R. 85). The company could
not produce a carbon copy of the endorsement which they
claim was attached to the face of the policy. Mr. Olschewski
was asked:

"Q. Do you have a carbon copy of the endorsement
alleged to have been attached to this policy?
A. No." (R. 63).

4. AN INSPECTION OF THE EYELETS ON THE
POLICY INDICATES THAT NO RIDER WAS EVER ATTACHED.
The company maintained that the endorsement changing
the policy to one of paid-up insurance was attached to the
face of the policy by the two outside eyelets. At the trial, witnesses for the company were asked to take their knives, if
they so desired, and to pry open said eyelets to determine if
any evidence of scraps of paper were present to indicate that
such a document was attached by the eyelets. The policy was
passed to the jury for their examination. It is submitted that
an examination at this time will show that the said eyelets
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have not either been removed or tampered with, and that
they do not show that any rider was ever attached by them
which has subsequently been torn off. This point is very significant since it is the very position of the Defendant that the
rider was so attached and an examination will not corroborate
such a position. The inspection of the Court is invited to the
policy and the eyelets attached thereon. The black photo
copies of the original application had been attached by the
center eyelet and had been torn off. An examination of that
eyelet will show that part of the black document is still under
the edges of that eyelet.
5. LINCOLN NATIONAL, A RE-INSURANCE COMpANY OF THE DEFENDANT, HAS NO RECORD SHOWING THAT THE POLICY HAD BEEN CONVERTED TO
PAID-UP INSURANCE.
It was maintained by the Defendant company that the

re-insurance company had been advised of the change. In this
regard, Mr. Barnett, cashier of Lincoln National, was subpoenaed to be present and to bring with him any documents
or papers concernng any notice or advice from the _Defendant
corporation regarding modifications of the policy.
Mr. Barnett was asked:

"Q. Mr. Barnett, were you advised that there were or
were not documents available showing the change
to paid-up policy?
A. There were no documents showing it had been
changed to a paid-up policy." (R. 107).
In another instance, he was asked the following questions:

16
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"Q. Were you subpoenaed to appear in this action?
A. I was.

Q. And in the subpoena were you requested to bring
any documents or papers concerning any notice or
advice from the Federal Security Insurance Company that may have been received concerning the
policy of Alma M. Page?
A. Yes.

Q. Particularly were you asked to bring any documents
of the Company that would indicate that your
Company had been advised that the policy had
been changed to a paid-up policy?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you and your Company make an attempt to
acquire and to locate those documents?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. What did you do?
A. Our local office does not have the information with
reference to reinsurance, so I called our Fort Wayne
office and the Reinsurance Department and asked
if there was anything there on file and I was informed as to what he had found.
Q. Did you request from that office any documents
pertaining to this particular policy and the fact that
it had or had not been converted to a paid-up
policy?

A. He informed me by telegram wtih reference to the
information requested on the subpoena.
Q. Do you have that telegram with you?
17
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A. I do. (Presents telegram to be marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 13) .
Q. I show you what has now been marked as Exhibit
13 and ask you if this is the telegram that you
received?

A. It is.
Q. Does it say that there are no documents or evidence
that the policy was changed to a paid-up policy?

A. It does." (R. 105, 106).
The telegram, Exhibit 13, which was received in evidence,
states as follows:
"No documents or evidence in our files that this
policy became paid up or was changed."
Without corroboration from the only independent source
which the defendant company gave to the plaintiffs where a
check might be made as to such conversion, the court was
left with only the self-serving documents of the defendant
corporation which could have been prepared or altered at
any time.
6. IT IS THE USUAL POLICY IN THE INSURANCE
TRADE TO MAKE A CHANGE RIGHT ON THE FACE
OF THE POLICY BY DRAWING A LINE THROUGH
THE FACE AMOUNT AND INSERTING THE NEW,
REDUCED, PAID-UP AMOUNT.

In this regard, 1\tir. Olschewski was asked as follows:

"Q. You say it is the custom that they do make a change
on the face, of reductions to paid up policies?
A. Yes." (R. 61).
18
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Although the company took great pains to write in red
on numerous office cards which were introduced as evidence
showing that the policy had been reduced and paid up, etc.,
it is submited that they made no change on the face of the
policy itself, which is the principal contract showing the obligations, rights and duties of the respective parties. It is their
contention, as shown by their brief, that the policy was in
their possession for the purpose of effectuating this election.
It is interesting to note that in connection with Exhibit 3, in red
pencil, a big "X" is marked through the amount of the insurance and at the side is written, "Reduced, paid up." Then on
August 8, 195 5, written in pen, it is stated, "Elected paid-up
for $1,443," which is circled in red. Nevertheless, one "K.\Y/.",
a secretary in the office of the company, at the very bottom
of the card, wrote in pen, "Lapsed, 9/16/55. K.W." The
secretary was identified but was not called to testify. It is inconceivable that she would have written on the bottom of the
card, "Lapsed, 9/16/55" if in fact the red notations were
placed thereon on 8/8/55 as was testified to by Mr. Olschewski.
Mr. Olschewski testified that he could not explain why
Exhibit 3 shows 9/16/55 as the lapse date. He testified as
follows:

"Q. Can you explain why Exhibit 3 shows 9/16/55
instead of 7/16/55? I will ask you this question:
Did that Exhibit 3 show the date lapsed was
9/16/55?
A. I can't explain why.

Q. It has the initials here 'K.W.' Is K.W. one of the
employees of the company?
A. Yes. Kay Walker.'' (R. 71).
19
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It was testified to by Mr. Olschewski that at the time of
the election on August 8, 1955, he made the various changes
on the cards which were introduced. However, on September
16, 1955, Exhibit 6, in a communication to Lincoln National
Life, the policy was identified and was shown to have been
lapsed. A document, Exhibit 8, produced from the files of
the defendant company from Lincoln National Life Insurance
Company, identifies the Page contract or policy and shows
that it was lapsed. The entry was made on January 4 ,1956
in connection with business for the month of October, 1955.
If the election had been made as testified to on August 8,
1955, it would appear that the records of the company should
so reflect rather than have the delay to September and October
and the notation that the policy had lapsed rather than that
it had been converted to paid-up insurance. As has previously
been stated, the automatic non-forfeiture provisions or loan
provisions would make the policy in full force and effect even
though it may have lapsed because of nonpayment of premiums.

7. A SECRETARY OF THE COMPANY, AFTER THE
DEATH OF THE INSURED, STATED THAT THE FULL
FACE AMOUNT OF THE POLICY WOULD BE PAID,
MINUS THE LOAN THEREON.
Mr. Page testified that, after the death of his son, he
called the company and talked to a secretary and requested
from her the necessary forms, and inquired about the amount
which would be paid. He stated that after waiting ten to
fifteen minutes on the telephone, he was advised that the face
amount of the policy would be paid minus the $400 loan
(R. 97-98).

20
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8. OFFICERS OF THE COMPANY STATED THAT,

IF THERE WAS STILL REINSURANCE, THEY WOULD
MAKE THE PAYMENT; THAT THEY HAD MADE A
MISTAKE.
Mr. Page testified that in a conversation with
Olschewski he was advised as follows:

Mr.

''Well, Mr. 0 lschewski said he was very busy and I
said I'd like to get this matter straightened out, and
then at that time Mr. Olschewski said they had made a
mistake and they would see if their reinsurance company would pay the policy. He said they would get
them to pay it provided it hadn't been terminated,
would be no loss to the Federal Security if the Lincoln
National would pay the policy and he would investi·
gate this case and see if that time had lapsed." (R.
100).

He testified further that a similar conversation was had
with the president of the company in the presence of Mr.
Olschewski (R. 101). In a letter from the general counsel
of the company, Exhibit 14, after the issue in this lawsuit was
presented, it was ~tated as follows:
"Initially we wish to state that if you are on the risk
for an amount in excess of $10,000, we are also on
the risk under our original reinsurance agreement."
Two Utah cases discuss the sufficiency of evidence in
insurance cases to warrant a submission of the factual issues
to the jury.
In Palace Laundry Co. vs. Royal Indemnity Co., 224 P.
657, 63 U. 201, the Supreme Court stated:
"While the evidence respecting these matters, to the
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mind of the writer, is meager and inconclusive, if there
was some substantial evidence from which the jury
could infer and find that the safe was broken open
by the use of some tool or tools, and that there were
some visible marks upon the same indicating that it
was opened by the use of such tools * * * "
The court then reviews the evidence and concludes as follows on this issue:
"It is true that some other witnesses who saw the safe
soon after the burglary said that they did not notice
the marks testified to by the manager. The mere fact
that they failed to notice them, however, was not conclusive. The jury had a right to believe the testimony
of the manager and the other evidence which indicated
the use of force and violence upon the safe. We are
forced to the conclusion, therefore, that there was some
substantial evidence showing that the defendant was
liable under the policy.''

In Rouleau vs. Continental Life Ins. & Investment Co., 45
Utah 234, 144 P. 1096, the court had occasion to consider the
sufficiency of the evidence to present a jury issue for determination wherein the company produced carbon copies of the
letter which purportedly served notice upon the plaintiff that
the policy had lapsed. The court in discussing this issue stated
as follows:
"Up to this point there is no conflict in the evidence.
The company claims that, in addition to the correspondence referred to, it, on the 16th day of October,
the last day of grace under the terms of the policy to
pay the premium, wrote the plaintiff, and produced
and put in evidence a carbon copy of the letter as
follows:
'Not having heard from you in answer to our
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letter of the 5th, we have been compelled to cancel
your policy No. 2508 on our books by its surrender
value.'
"There is proof that such a letter was dictated to a
stenographer by the company manager, and that it
was signed by him, but the defendant made no sufficien·~
proof that it was mailed; that it was deposited in the
post office, or United States letter box, or delivered
to a United States mail carrier, or other agency or
instrumentality in charge of or under the control of
the United States mail service. But that defect of proof
is supplied by this: Plaintiff's wife, in writing for him
on the 31st of October, the day he mailed the money
order and the note, in that letter stated:
'Just in reach of your letter of the 16th, for having left my business in hands of others, for I was
compelled to absent myself from the city, and on
my return, see that this thing was not attended to.
I now forward the amount required, trusting that
you will accept it, although I know that it is late.
If accepted, please send receipt.'
"It is thus seen that in that letter reference is made
to a letter from the company 'of the 16th.' The plaintiff
in explanation of that, testified that his wife, and not
he, wrote and signed the letter, and, in effect, that he
had no knowledge that it contained such statement,
and that the letter to which he, in fact, replied was the
letter of October 5th, in that he had not received nor
seen any such letter as that of the 16th.
"On this evidence the case was submitted to the
jury, who rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
for the face of the policy less the loan and unpaid
premiums. The defendant appeals."
It was the contention of the insurance company that the
policy was cancelled on the 16th day of October, the last day
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of the grace terms under the policy. At the conclusion of
the case a motion for a directed verdict was made but denied.
The court in considering the issues raised by such motion
concluded that even under the foregoing set of facts, there
was sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. In so
doing it stated as follows:
"At the outset let it be said that, if the evidence
without conflict shows, as contended for by the defendant, that its letter of October 16th, 1911, notifying
the plaintiff of the cancellation of the policy, was
received by him, then the defendant is entitled to prevail. The court so, in effect, instructed the jury. The
evidence as to that, however, is, as we think, in conflict.
There, of course, is good and sufficient evidence to
show as has been seen, that the letter of October 16th
was sent by the defendant, that it was received by the
plaintiff in due course. That is supported by the plaintiff's letter written on the 31st acknowledging the
receipt of the letter of the 16th from the company. But
on the other hand, there is evidence to support a contrary finding. Supporting that is the testimony of the
plaintiff that no such letter was received by him, his
explanation how reference to 'the 16th' was made in
his letter of the 31st written by his wife, his letter
apparently responsive to another letter, the letter of
the defendant of November 11th, wherein it undertook
to state the time and the manner notice was given
the plaintiff of a cancellation of the policy, making
direct reference to and copying its letter of November
2nd, but making none whatever to its alleged letter of
October 16th, in the probability or improbability of
its declaring the policy cancelled on a day on which
it, under its terms, was not subject to cancellation or
forfeiture, and not until a later day. What the real
truth is in such respect, and whether the claim of the
defendant or that of the plaintiff was supported by the
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greater weight of the evidence, was for the Jury.
(Citation of authorities.)
"The defendant therefore was not entitled to a
direction of a verdict, or to a charge, on the theory that
the evidence without conflict showed that the letter
of October 16th was received by the plaintiff and that
he then was notified of the cancellation of the policy."
The judgment entered upon the verdict of the jury was
affirmed.
All of the foregoing evidence is more than ample to sustain the verdict of the jury. No written request, no copy of
the endorsement, no changes made on the face of the policy,
no evidence that any endorsement had ever been attached
by the eyelets to the policy; that it was the usual custom to
require a written request and make a change on the face of
the policy; that the secretary said the full amount minus the
loan would be paid; delay in making any change on the
records of the company, and inconsistent modifications shown
by their own self-serving records, plus the fact that the president
and vice president of the company had said a mistake had been
made and if there was re-insurance it would be paid, not
only sustain the finding, but compel a finding to the effect that
the defendant had not sustained its burden of proof in showing
that a paid-up election had been made.

CONCLUSION
Recognizing that when a life insurance contract is to be
construed and placed into effect, one of the contracting parties
will be deceased, insurance companies are required to be
25
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extremely cautious and careful in seeing that the contract
is complete in all respects. An insurance company, which has
a large office staff, trained personnel, and control of the
various endorsements, modifications, and terms of the contract
which are requested and discussed or agreed to by the contracting parties, should be required to make sure that there
can be no question about the terms of the contract. If a modification of the contract is to be accomplished, it is only reasonable to require that that change be made on the face of the
policy and, in addition, if necessary, that a rider or endorsement be attached thereto. An example of the danger involved
is present in this case if the defendant corporation is able to
establish that there was a substantial reduction in the coverage
of the policy by self-serving documents in their own office,
which could be changed, prepared and produced at any time.
Mr. Page, the insured, is not present to testify and there is
nothing on the policy itself to show that there has ever been
a change. The face amount was not changed, and there is
no evidence that there was ever a rider or attachment made
to the policy by the two eyelets as claimed by the defendant
corporation.
The trial judge, Judge Martin Larson~ recognized that
there was a factual issue for determination by the jury when
he denied the defendant corporation's motion for a directed
verdict prior to submitting the case to the jury. He again
reaffirmed this position in denying their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, wherein
he stated as follows:
"The court thinks that there was a question of fact
for the jury to determine and thought so at the time
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he submitted the case to the jury, that there was a
factual question for determination * * * .
"The courts in Utah always tell the jury that they
are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts and
credibility of the witnesses. Now, if there is a question
for them to pass upon, it would be kind of an absurd
proposition to tell the jury that they are the sole
judges of the facts and credibility of the witnesses if
you view the facts and credibility of the witnesses the
same as I do, and if you differ from me, then you are
no judge of the facts or the credibility at all, so I will
proceed to judge it.
"So the motion that has been argued and presented
is denied.''
The decision of the trial judge, as well as the verdict of
the jury, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY, BOYER & RONNOW
and DAN S. BUSHNEI .L

Attorneys for Appellant
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